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This paper will briefly consider the theory and recent history of tax harmonization and 
competition in Europe and the OECD countries.  This will be followed by an 
examination of the current situation in Croatia and neighboring countries.  The scope for 
competition and/or need for harmonization will be explored.  Comparison tables of 
taxes and rates in Croatia, Austria, BiH, Hungary, Slovenia, and Yugoslavia, along with 
the Czech Republic, Italy, Germany and the US will be included. 
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Tax Harmonization or Competition: Croatia and Neighboring Countries 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Tax systems vary widely among countries, and in some countries, among lower levels 
of government as well.  Many believe that taxes among neighboring countries or 
jurisdictions should be harmonized, or at least that the rates should be fairly close, to 
prevent distortions in the movement of goods, investment, or people.  The OECD
1 and 
the EU both promote tax cooperation.  The EU Commission has advocated the 
harmonization of both direct and indirect taxes, but Member States have been reluctant 
agree to further harmonization beyond what is currently in place with indirect taxes.  On 
the other hand, tax competition in the form of various tax concessions among countries 
and lower levels of government to attract new businesses or investments is also 
common.  In the US, a number of States have come to voluntary agreements to 
harmonize rates or cooperate in other ways, but more do not make any attempt to deal 
with the effects of differing rates.  The Federal government has no role in regulating 
States’ tax policies other than to ensure the free movement of goods, services and 
people. 
  There is little doubt that differences in tax systems can affect investment, trade 
and even the movement of people.  However, whether this is a good or bad thing is still 
being debated.  The EU Commission has been working for full harmonization of 
indirect taxes for years, and the OECD has also become active in fighting what it 
considers harmful tax competition.  Much of the literature has assumed that tax 
competition is a bad thing that will lead to decreases in tax revenues and therefore the 
level of public services.  However, there are more than efficiency arguments to be 
made.  The issue of sovereignty is also important.  The members of the EU Monetary 
Union have given up individual monetary policy.  It seems unlikely that those countries 
will now give up fiscal policy as well.  Countries and lower levels of governments do 
not willingly give up their right to set tax rates, regardless of possible adverse effects.   
 
                                                 
1 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, set up in 1961 and now consisting of 29 
countries.  Of the countries covered here, Austria, Germany , Italy and the US were original members.  
The Czech Republic joined in 1995 and Hungary in 1996.   3
This paper will briefly consider the theoretical discussion on tax competition followed 
by efforts to harmonize taxes in the EU and steps made to deal with tax competition by 
OECD countries.  The state tax systems in the US serve as a counter-example to some 
of the EU arguments for increased harmonization.  This will be followed by an 
examination of the current situation in Croatia and neighboring countries; Austria, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Hungary, Slovenia and Yugoslavia, as well as the 
Czech Republic, Italy, Germany, and the US for comparison. 
 
2.  Theory of tax competition 
 
Vito Tanzi (1996) examined the possible effect of globalization on tax systems.   
Although he finds no evidence of a decrease in revenues to GDP between 1980-94, 
which would indicate a lowering of rates due to competition, he discusses a number of 
possible effects.  He looks at the possibility for countries to decrease sales tax rates to 
attract cross-border shoppers.  This is an issue within the EU, where tax revenues for the 
most part stay where the goods are purchased, but not with sales to people living 
outside, since non-EU citizens are eligible for VAT refunds.  Tanzi feels that there was 
growing evidence that corporate income tax considerations are important in the location 
of multinationals.  The issues for individual income taxes are both people moving as a 
result of tax differences and competition for people’s savings, since it is now possible to 
investment outside of one’s country.  Tanzi concludes that tax competition may 
decrease revenues, change tax structures and decrease progressivity.  The OECD is 
trying to deal with mobile capital issues with their work on tax havens and potentially 
harmful tax practices.   
  The recent literature on the effects of tax competition began by looking at the 
possible efficiency problems arising from local government competition for capital.   
Wilson (1999) reviews this literature, and the following is based on his survey.  The 
main argument has been that tax rates will be bid down in an attempt to attract 
investments or sales in a  “race to the bottom”.  These lower rates will therefore provide 
insufficient local revenues to provide local services.  Since the mid-1980s, there have 
been continuous extensions of the original investment competition models.  However, 
extensions of the earlier models have not upheld the conclusions.  As is always the case 
in economic modeling, as the models become more complex, so do the conclusions.  A 
recent paper by Keen (2001) finds that preferential tax regimes can sometimes improve   4
welfare.  Competition among governments has both good and bad aspects.  However, 
the assumption that tax competition is bad, as some forms may well be, is standard in 
the EU Commission’s policy on tax harmonization. “Such competition between 
Member States puts downward pressure on the level of tax and contributions which may 
be damaging if it is not regulated, as it undermines the fairness and overall efficiency of 
tax systems” (European Commission, 2000).   The OECD has promoted cooperation 
and targeted specific policies, while stating that fair competition is a good thing.  The 
following section covers their attempts to deal with this issue. 
 
3.  Harmonization Efforts in the EU and the OECD  
 
Tax harmonization in the EC began with the Original Treaty establishingthe European 
Community in 1957.  Article 90 of the EC Treaty prohibits any tax discrimination that 
would give an advantage to national products over products from other Member States.  
Article 93 calls for harmonization of turnover taxes, excise duties and other indirect 
taxes.  Article 269 states the EC budget is to be financed from its own tax sources: 
agriculture, customs and a percentage of each Member’s value added tax (VAT) 
revenues.  Unanimity is required for all changes to tax systems, which has become more 
of an issue as the level of tax harmonization has increased.   
  A VAT was introduced in Europe in 1970 with the 1
st and 2
nd VAT Directives.  
The 6
th VAT Directive (1977) harmonizes VAT systems in all EU countries by ensuring 
that the same transactions are subject to VAT.   The VAT was first organized on the 
destination principle, meaning that goods are taxed where consumed.  Imports are taxed 
in the same way as domestically produced goods, and exports are subject to a 0% rate so 
they can enter the importing country untaxed.  In 1987, the EC Commission proposed 
moving to the origin principle, where goods are taxed where they are sold, in order to 
eliminate border controls.  The Commission also suggested target rates of 4-9% for the 
reduced rate and 14-20% for the standard rate.  Member states have been unable to 
agree on a clearing system for a move to an origin base, or to align rates.  The current 
VAT system is a combination of the two.  Crossing a border is no longer a taxable 
event, and at the retail level, VAT revenues remain in the country where a good is sold, 
with the exceptions of autos or mail-order goods.  However, the destination principle 
still applies for companies.  In 1993 excise taxes were harmonized.  The same goods, 
tobacco, alcohol, and oil products, are taxed, and are subject  to minimum rates.  There   5
were also further adjustments to the VAT system in 1992 and 1995.  The Commission is 
still aiming for an origin based VAT with equal rates, but Member States have not 
supported this so far.   
  In 1996 the Commission proposed a comprehensive strategy in direct taxation 
policy that would complete the single market and protect tax bases against harmful 
competition.  It was not intended to harmonize all taxes, but a high degree of 
harmonization in indirect taxes was considered desirable (Taxation and Customs Union: 
The Taxation Package, 2001).  Previous attempts to harmonize corporate tax rates in 
1975, rules on carryovers in 1984-5, and tax bases in 1980 all failed.  There has been 
some progress on double taxation.   
  In December 1997, the Commission proposed a package including a Code of 
Conduct for business taxation to eliminate harmful business tax regimes, ensure a 
minimum level of savings taxation, and eliminate source taxes on interest and royalty 
payments between countries.    The Code of Conduct is non-binding, but Member States 
are to roll back existing measures that conflict with it.  A list of measures falling under 
the Code was published in February 2000 (Taxation and Customs Union: The Taxation 
Package, 2001).  Member States were to either provide information about the 
investment income of residents of other states or apply a withholding tax of at least 20% 
(Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg chose this option with a 5 year transition period). 
Interest and royalty payment withholding was proposed in March 1998, with transitional 
periods for Greece and Portugal.   
  In November, 2000, Member states agreed on the essential lines of  future 
treatment of savings income.  All harmful business tax measures are to be dismantled by 
January 2003, and the benefits to run out by the end of 2005, with some flexibility.  A 
compromise was reached on the payment of interest and royalties.  Member states 
agreed to come to a final agreement on the tax package by the end of 2002.  The focus 
of future tax cooperation will be on the uniform application of tax laws, modernization 
of the VAT system, changing to an origin based VAT, replacing the current VAT refund 
procedure by allowing traders to deduct VAT paid anywhere in the Community in their 
state, abolishing the rule that a tax representative must be in every state they trade in, 
and the creation of single contact points for information.  There is still a distinct 
difference between the views in Brussels and individual countries. “Differences in tax 
law still are a serious obstacle to a single market.  We need uniformity and a 
comprehensive strategy” (European Commission, 2000).     6
  Partly for historical reasons, there is a very different approach to harmonization 
among individual states in the US and the EU Commission.  This is clear from the large 
differences in tax rates among states.  Some states have no income taxes, and others 
have no sales taxes.  Property tax rates differ widely.  Personal and corporate income 
tax rates vary between 0%-12%.  Sales tax rates vary between 0% and 7% at the State 
level, with another 0%-3.5% added at the local level.  Although these differences clearly 
impact businesses and consumers, it has not hampered the free movement of goods or 
people.  On the other hand, the Commission states “Differences in national tax law 
remain a serious obstacle to the completion of the single market, as incompatible 
systems hamper trade and tend to compartmentalize the EU market” (European 
Commission, 2000).  
 The  OECD’s (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 
Committee for Fiscal Affairs has done extensive work on double taxation treaties.  In 
1996 the OECD was asked by member countries to develop measures to counter the 
negative effects of harmful tax competition on investment and financing decisions, as 
well as to examine possible consequences for individual country’s tax bases.  The result 
was the 1998 Report “Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue”, and 
subsequent updates.  The 1998 Report listed guidelines for identifying potentially 
harmful preferential tax regimes, recommendations, included a recommendation to set 
up a forum to work on these issues, and prepared a list of countries that could be 
considered tax havens.  The OECD’s focus is more narrow than the EU’s; it deals only 
with mobile investment in the financial area and services.  It does not suggest 
attempting to harmonize rates or structures and recognizes that fair and transparent 
competition is a good thing (Hammer and Owens, 2001).  However, it is noted that tax 
havens or harmful preferential tax regimes can decrease effective tax rates and distort 
both financial and real investment flows, as well as decrease the integrity and fairness of 
a tax system, change the mix and level of taxes and public spending, and move the tax 
burden to less mobile businesses and people and increase administration costs.   
  The 1998 OECD Report focuses on tax havens and preferential tax regimes, not 
on tax levels.  Tax havens are defined as being characterized by low or no corporate 
taxes, a lack of effective exchange of information, or transparency, and no substantial 
business activities.  Harmful preferential tax regimes are defined as having low or no 
effective tax rates, ring fencing (preferred firms are isolated from domestic activity, 
either because domestic capital is not eligible or only foreign entities are eligible), and   7
lack of transparency or exchange of information.  There are a number of other possible 
characteristics listed, such as the abuse of transfer prices, negotiable tax rates, and 
artificial tax bases, among others.  To assess the economic impact of these regimes, the 
Report considers whether the regime shifts economic activity from other countries 
rather than encourages new investment, whether the level of economic activity in line 
with investment levels, or whether the preferential tax regime is the primary reason for 
the location of a business.  Clearly these are difficult judgments to make.   
  The recommendations for dealing with harmful preferential tax regimes include: 
countries are to stop adopting new harmful tax measures, to review existing measures, 
and to remove such measures by the end of 2000, with effect by the end of 2005, to 
request the OECD Forum to examine other potentially harmful practices, and to both 
cooperate with the Forum and to work with non-OECD countries through the Forum 
(1998 Report).   
  The update on the 1998 OECD Report, “Towards Global Tax Cooperation” 
(2000), outlines the review processes and the current state of the tax haven and 
potentially harmful preferential tax regime lists.  The 1999 Forum identified 47 
potential tax havens, and requested explanations from them.    Of the 40 tax havens 
subsequently identified, 6 have since pledged to eliminated those practices by the end of 
2005, and 32 have contacted the OECD for dialogue (Hammer and Owens, 2001).   
OECD countries have agreed to eliminate tax havens by the end of 2003.  The 2000 
report lists also countries and potentially harmful preferential regimes.   It recognizes 
the need for further investigation as to which of these are truly harmful, as well as for 
vigilance against future harmful tax regimes.  Its aim is to eliminate all such practices 
within the OECD by the end of 2005.   
  None of the countries covered here are on the OECD list of tax havens.   
However, several are listed as having potentially harmful preferential tax regimes.  The 
definition does not include investment incentives, which most countries have, as long as 
both foreign and domestic investors are eligible.   Hungary is listed for allowing a 100% 
foreign owned company to be treated as an offshore company and therefore not subject 
to corporate income tax.  Hungary also gives venture capital companies a 100% income 
credit for 6-7 years.  Germany and Italy are listed for international shipping and 
Germany for headquarters regimes.  Italy is also listed for an investment scheme that is 
noted to be non-operational. 
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4.  Trends in Transition Countries 
 
Changes in former socialist countries in the last 10 years have been more dramatic than 
the issues dealt with in the European Union and most OECD countries.  In most 
socialist systems, tax rates were the residual.  For indirect taxes, retail and wholesale 
prices were often set centrally so the tax was the difference between the two.  Therefore, 
there were a large number of “rates”.   The Former Yugoslavia was no exception.  BiH 
and Yugoslavia still have a large number of different types of taxes and rates, although 
this is changing.  Taxes on wages were invisible to taxpayers, who were aware only 
their net wages.  Many former socialist countries have introduced a VAT since the 
changes in 1989.  Hungary was the first in 1988.  Many transition economies do not 
have a global income tax that aggregates different sources of income and taxes the total.  
BiH, Slovenia and Yugoslavia do not have a global income tax, although Croatia does.  
Some OECD countries are now moving away from a global income tax by using a flat 
final withholding tax on certain sources of income.  Austria, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, and Italy have a flat tax rate for capital gains.  In some former Yugoslav 
countries, there is confusion about calculating taxes and contribution on wages since the 
old system based calculations on net wages, and some of the successor states use a 
variation of that.   Croatia completed a major overhaul of the tax system in 1994.  Profit 
tax changed to corporate income tax in most of Croatia’s neighboring countries. 
Provisions for interest and dividend income have been added.  
 
5.  Croatia and Neighboring Countries   
 
Croatia is a small country with slightly more than 4 million people.  Croatia was part of 
the former Yugoslavia and shares a long border with BiH, and shorter ones with 
Slovenia and Yugoslavia.  Partly as a result of the wars during the last 10 years, people 
are not very mobile across borders, in spite of speaking related languages.  However, 
trade is increasing again, so these former-Yugoslav countries will be competing for 
investment as the political situation stabilizes. They will also be competing with 
Hungary and Austria.  Investment decisions are based on more than taxes.  Relative 
wages, education levels, resources, size of markets, rule of law, the legal and regulatory 
systems and political stability are all important.  Since the breakup of Yugoslavia 10   9
years ago, other issues have been more important.  However, as the region stabilizes, 
relative tax levels will become more important.    
  The country of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) that was  recognized in 1992, but 
only emerged at the end of 1995 after nearly 4 years of war, is unique.  The Dayton 
Peace Accords set up an extremely decentralized State structure made up of two Entities 
with their own customs and tax systems.  The Entities are the Federation of BiH, with 
its capital in Sarajevo, and the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) with its capital in 
Banja Luka.  Only in 2001 has a single border service to collect customs been set up.  
Yugoslavia is also unique.  During much of 1990s, there were tax laws that had been 
enacted at the Federal level, but that were essentially ignored by both the Serbian and 
Montenegrin Republic governments.  There was a general tax framework law at the 
Federal level, but the two systems were different.  The tables shown here include only 
Serbia, by far the largest part of the Federal Republic.   
 Croatia’s two northern neighbors are quite different as well.  Slovenia has 
probably made the most economic progress of any of the former Yugoslav Republics, 
and Hungary has a long history of reform dating from the late 1960’s.  The New 
Economic Mechanism of 1968 began a long process of reform, although there were 
many pauses and periods of backtracking.  However, Hungary had introduced a modern 
tax system in 1988 and limits on private ownership and businesses had in many cases 
already been abolished.  Intensive foreign investment began much earlier in Hungary, 
with $9 billion by 1994 (see Table 1).  The Czech Republic (and Poland) have surpassed 
Hungary in foreign investment in the last few years, but the total is still higher in 
Hungary, and the annual amount is stable since 1997 at $1.5 billion.  Hungary had a 
series of tax incentives during this period.  However, probably more important was the 
open attitude towards foreign investment, and lower informal barriers to investment 
such as bureaucratic red tape.  Admittedly, the political instability and wars in former 
Yugoslavia also made Hungary and the other Central European countries more 
attractive.  Croatia had a total of nearly $3 billion in foreign investment by the end of 
2000, which was still greater than Slovenia, and BiH. 
 
5a.  Table 2—Taxes as a percent of GDP 
Table 2 shows the shares of tax revenues to GDP for Croatia, neighboring countries, and 
four other countries for comparison.  Of the countries shown, Croatia has the highest tax 
to GDP ration, at 46.6%.  Only Slovenia is close with 40.1%.  The EU countries shown,   10 
Austria, Germany and Italy, are much lower, at 30% or less.  BiH figures do not include 
social insurance funds, so are not directly comparable.  The ratio of personal income 
taxes to GDP is higher in the EU countries shown and the US, at around 10% or more.  
In Croatia  only 6% of GDP comes from personal income taxes, which is again closer to 
Slovenia, and still greater than in BiH or Yugoslavia (Serbia only in these statistics). 
  Social contributions as a share of GDP are the lowest in the US, but roughly 
similar elsewhere at around 12-15% of GDP.  They are the highest in the Czech 
Republic at 17%.  The Federation of BiH expenditures on social insurance is similar at 
16%, but are much lower in the Serb Republic at 5%.  The column for goods and 
services includes VAT, or sales taxes, and excises.  All countries except BiH, 
Yugoslavia and the US have a VAT system.  In the US, sales taxes  are levied only at 
the state and local levels.  The Federal government can levy only direct taxes and 
customs.  Croatia has the highest level of tax income from indirect taxes, with the 
exception of the Federation of BiH, at 20%.  Most have 10-15% of GDP collected as 
indirect taxes.  The final tax column, other, includes payroll taxes in Austria and 
Slovenia.  The overall level of taxes to GDP is the highest in Croatia, and probably 
needs to come down to a level closer to the range of neighboring countries.   
 
5b.  Table 3--Personal Income Tax 
All withholding taxes are included in the personal income tax table with personal 
income taxes unless they are levied specifically on companies.  Most countries covered 
in the table tax dividends, interest and sometimes royalty payments at 10-25%. Most 
have progressive tax rates on all other income.  Croatia has among the lower rates with 
a top rate of 35%.  Only the Czech Republic is slightly lower.  Austria, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Germany, Italy and the US all have a top rate of 40-50%.  BiH and 
Yugoslavia differ with flat rates of 9-14% on wage income.  Other sources are either 
subject to progressive rates or each source is taxed at a different flat rate (Federation of 
BiH).  Contribution rates are higher than income tax rates everywhere.  Most combined 
employer and employee contributions are around 35-45% of gross wages.  The two 
outliers are Yugoslavia at 58% and the US at 15%.  Croatia is at the lower end at 37%. 
 
5c.  Table 4--Corporate Income Tax  
The corporate income tax rates shown in Table 4 give only the basic rate.  This is far 
from the entire story, since exemptions and special provisions can make the effective   11 
rates quite different.  However, just looking at the rates, Croatia, at 20%, is lower than 
most neighbors with the exception of Hungary at 18%.  The Serb Republic in BiH has 
regressive rates from 20% on the lowest incomes and 10% on the highest.  Austria is at 
34%, the Federation of BiH and Yugoslavia at 20-30%, and Slovenia at 25%. Rates are 
similar in the comparison countries: 31% in the Czech Republic, 31-42% in Germany 
and 15-39% in the US.   
 
5d.  Table 5--Value Added Taxes 
The VAT has the most impact on trade.  In small countries, it is easy to travel to a 
neighboring country to shop. Most of Croatia’s neighbors have introduced a VAT to 
replace sales and turnover taxes.  BiH and Yugoslavia still have sales taxes.  Croatia’s 
standard rate of 22% is within the range of neighboring countries:  Austria, Slovenia 
and Italy are lower at 20%, and Hungary is higher at 25%.  BiH sales taxes are at 20-
24%.  These are extremely high rates for a sales tax.  Without the self-enforcing need 
for receipts in a VAT system to receive a refund, high sales tax rates are easier to avoid.  
Food is subject to the lower or 0% rate in all the countries covered.  Only Croatia has no 
reduced rate, although more goods were added to the 0% rate recently.   
 
6.  Concluding Thoughts 
 
The OECD’s efforts to identify potentially harmful tax practices, while recognizing   
individual countries’ right to distinct tax structures and rates, make sense.  The EU 
Commission is trying to go further, but is mixing what they would like to see, in terms 
of increased harmonization and a single tax system, with what is actually necessary for 
a single market.  It is true that if rates are too different, trade and investment can be 
distorted.   However, rates on all types of taxes vary widely by state, but no one would 
argue that the US is not a single market. More work on bureaucratic obstacles to free 
movement of goods and services in the EU would probably have more impact, and is 
also an area that the Commission is looking at.  The EU countries which have joined the 
monetary union have already given up individual monetary policy.  It seems unlikely 
that these governments will also give up independent fiscal policy.  It is also not clear 
that this is necessary for a single market.  For Croatia, looking at bureaucratic problems 
for cross-border trade and investment is important as well.  Cooperation with 
neighboring countries’ tax administrations is vital.   12 
  Although Croatian tax rates are in line with neighboring countries, total taxes are 
a much larger part of GDP.  This is mostly due to indirect taxes, or VAT and excise 
taxes.  Although there is a great variation in tax rates among the neighboring countries  
perceived political stability in the region is still having a negative effect on Croatia 
along with bureaucratic delays and red tape, and the general climate towards foreign 
investment. 
  As far as competition for investment is concerned, there may be  an issue of 
giving away the tax base to attract new investment.  Clearly many tax jurisdictions feel 
it is worth having new jobs, or there would not be so much of this type of competition.  
The evidence on whether this is helpful is unclear at this point.  For personal income 
taxes, there is little evidence in the EU, let alone the former Yugoslavia, that people, 
apart from a few high profile earners, move to live in a lower tax country.  Language 
differences is one obvious reason for this in Europe.   
  Croatia shares a very long border with BiH, which due to the war and continuing 
ethnic problems, does not have a very disciplined tax system.  This, along with high 
sales tax rates and many small border crossings, makes it very difficult for Croatia to 
control its border.  The capital city of Zagreb, with a large part of Croatia’s population, 
lies less than a half hour’s drive from the Slovene border, so Slovenia’s tax policy also 
matters to Croatia.  Austria and Hungary are only 2 hours away from Zagreb.  With a 
destination based VAT, the issue is more that different rates.  As long as shoppers get a 
refund for purchases in another country, cross-border shopping will be less expensive 
than in the home country and will continue.  At this point, this appears to be mostly one 
way, with Croatian shoppers going to Slovenia, Austria, and Hungary.  With BiH, the 
issue is more one of increasing cooperation among customs and tax administration 
officials in the two countries to decrease tax evasion on both sides of the long border.  
This is in both countries’ interest.   The destination based VAT issue is harder to solve.  
In the future, some mixed system like in the EU may be a possibility, with sales taxes 
for retail sales staying in the country of purchase, but firms continuing on the 
destination principle.  Progress made in solving this issue within the EU will be 
important for Croatia as well. 
   13 
Table 1 
 
  Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows 
  million US$ 
  1990-1994 1995  1996  1997 1998  1999 1990-2000 
Croatia 185  83  529  346 854  750 2,747
BiH --  0  0  504 100  60 664
Hungary 9,010  4,453  1,953  1,653 1,453  1,550 20,072
Slovenia 394  170  178  295 154  210 1,401
             
Czech Republic  2,284  2,526  1,388  1,275 2,485  3,500 13,458
            

























Croatia 46.6  5.8 2.5 13.9    20.4  3.5 
Austria 29.2  10.0 2.1 15.1  0.6  12.4  4.0 
BiH-Fed. 33.9  4.9  1.7  *    26.4 0.9 
BiH-RS 17.1 2.2  0.0  *    14.1  0.8 
Hungary 24.8 6.5  2.2  13.9  0.6 15.1 0.3 
Slovenia 40.1 6.6  1.2  13.8    14.7 1.4 
Yugoslavia 35.0  3.6  0.3  12.4    11.8  7.2 
              
Czech R.  21.4  5.2  3.7  16.9  0.6  11.9  - 
Germany 22.0  9.3  1.6  14.9  0.9  10.1  - 
Italy 30.1  10.7  3.0  12.5  2.0  11.7  2.6 
US 22.1  11.7  2.6  6.9  3.1  4.7  - 
*Social contributions were mostly in off-budget funds, combined with transfers from 
the budget.  Expenditures were 16% of GDP in the Federation and 5.4% in the RS. 
Sources:  OECD Revenue Statistics 2000, p. 70, Bulletin of the Government Finance 
5/2000, Republic of Slovenia, Ministry of Finance, p. 7, Annual Report of the Ministry 
of Finance, 1999-Republic of Croatia, 2000, pp. 63-4, IMF Staff Country Report 00/77, 





   14 
Table 3 
 
Personal Income Tax, 2000 
 
Rates:  Thresholds: All amounts shown in DEM.  Exchange rates as of the end of 2000. 
    
CROATIA    
    
15%  < 7722  revised January 2001  
25%  to 19305  15% or 35% withholding on dividends and interest 
35% >  19305   
Contributions:  Total: 37.2%--18.6% employee and employer       
    
AUSTRIA    
0% <  7,106   
21%  to 14,213  25% final withholding on dividends and interest 
31% to  42,460   
41% to  99,495  3% payroll tax at municipal level 
50%  > 99,495    
Contributions:  Total: 38.8-39.8%--17.15-17.7% employee, 21.65-22.1% employer   
    
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:  FEDERATION  
    
10%    flat rate on wage income 
30-50%    For other sources of income: varies by type  
Contributions:  Total: 45%--32% employee, 13% employer  
    
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: SERB REPUBLIC 
    
9%    wage income 
0%  to 10,000  other sources of income subject to schedule 
15%  to 15,000  rental income 15% 
20% to  25,000   
25% >  25,000   
Contributions:  Total 44%--22% each employee and employer 
    
HUNGARY    
    
20%  < 2,916  20%-securities, property sale, rental of land or buildings 
30%  to 7,292  35%-excess dividends 
40%  > 7,292  20% final withholding on dividends to non-resident accounts, 0% resident 
Contributions:  Total: 48.5%--12.5% employee, 36% employer   
       
SLOVENIA    
    
17% <  9,558   
35% to  19,116  25% withholding on dividends for residents 
37% to  28,674  15% final withholding on dividends for nonresidents 
40%  to 38,233   25% withholding on interest and royalties for non-residents 
45%  to 57,349    
50%  > 57,349      15 
0-15%    progressive payroll tax  
Contributions:  Total: 38%--22.10% employee, 15.9% employer    
       
YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA) 
14%    flat rate on salaries 
20%    on self employment, investment, property rental, and other income 
10%  < 14,314  if income > 21,470, subject to these rates: 10-20% 
15%  to 28,627  20% withholding on royalties 
20% >  28,627   
Contributions:  Total: 57.97%--26.6% employer and employee.  plus 3% municipal, 1.3% 
housing solidarity, 0.47% chamber of commerce by employer 
    
CZECH REPUBLIC   
    
15% <  5,677  25% on profits from investment and pension funds 
20% to  11,354  25% final withholding: royalties 
25% to  17,366  15% final withholding: dividends, interest, supplementary private pensions 
32% >  17,366   
Contributions:  Total: 47.5%--12.5% employee, 35% employer   
       
GERMANY    
     
0%  to 13,499  single taxpayer—all tax rates include a 5.5% solidarity surcharge 
22.9-25%  to 17,495  26.38% withholding: dividends, bonds, participating loan interest  
25-51%  to 114,695 31.65% withholding: bank interest 
51%  > 114,695  31.65% +5% for anonymous over-the-counter banking 
Contributions:  Total: 40.5-42.0%--20.5% employee, 20.5% employer, slightly higher in the 
5 new lander   
    
ITALY    
    
18.5%  < 15152  27% final withholding on bank interest, bond interest < 18 months maturity, 
dividends to non-residents 
25.5%  to 30,303  12.5% final withholding on state bond interest and > 18 months maturity 
33.5%  to 60,606  30% withholding on royalties to non-residents 
39.5%  to 136,363  regional surcharges: 0.9-1.4%, municipal: 0-0.4% 
45.5% >  136,363    
Contributions:  Total 35-47%--up to 10.2% employee, balance employer   
    
UNITED STATES    
15.0%  < 72,515  for a single taxpayer 
28.0% to  175,557   
31.0%  to 366,307  20% rate for capital gains if held > 12 months (10% for lowest tax bracket)  
36.0%  to 796,567  State income tax rates vary between 0%-12% in addition to Federal taxes 
39.6% >  796,567   
Contributions:  Total: 15.30%--7.65% employee and employer 
     
Sources    European Tax Handbook, 2000, Institut za Javnih Financije, 2000, Ministries 
of Finance, BiH, Ernst and Young, 2001. 
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Table 4 
 
CORPORATE PROFIT TAX-2000 
 
 Rates: 
CROATIA  20% on worldwide income 
  
AUSTRIA   34% on worldwide income for residents, including capital gains 
  20% final withholding on royalties for non-resident companies, 0% for residents 
  
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA-FEDERATION 
  30% on income plus taxes on wholesale and retail margins 
  
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA-SERB REPUBLIC 
  20% to100,000   plus taxes on wholesale margins 
  15% to 300,000 
  12% to 500,000 
  10% > 500,000 
    
HUNGARY  18% on worldwide income 
  18% final withholding on dividends to foreign organizations, 0% for domestic 
  




  20% withholding on dividends, interest and royalties 
 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
  31% lowered from 35% in January 2000 
  
GERMANY  42.2% on retained profits, includes 5.5% solidarity surcharge 
  31.65% on distributed profits, includes 5.5% 
  
ITALY  37% standard rate 
 
19% on portion of income from capital increase from 1996 and newly listed 
companies (7% in the founding and following 2 years) 
  
UNITED STATES 
  15%  < 103,813 
  25%  to 155,719 
  34%  to 207,625 
  39%  to 695,544 
  34%  to 20.763 million 
  35%  to 31.144 million 
  38%  to 38.063 million 
  35%  > 38.064 million 
  additional State level corporate income tax rates: 0%-12% 
   
Sources:   
European Tax Handbook, 2000, Institut za Javnih Financije, 2000, Ministries of 
Finance, BiH, Ernst and Young, 2001.   17 
Table 5 
 
VALUE ADDED TAX-2000 
Rates:  
CROATIA  Introduced 1 January, 1998 
22% standard  rate 
0%  exports, bread, milk, books, medicines and medical products 
Exempt:  housing rental, financial services, some gambling, health, education, religious services, 
culture 
    
AUSTRIA   
20% standard  rate 
16%  duty free zones 
10%  foodstuffs, books, newspapers, passenger transport, residential rentals 
0% Exports 
Exempt:  transactions subject to real estate transfer tax (without credit) 
  
BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA-FEDERATION—sales tax 
24%  standard rate goods and services 
12%  Fuel for heating, some food 
0% Foodstuffs 
  
BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA-SERB REPUBLIC—sales tax 
20%  standard rate goods—includes 2% tax railroads 
10%  standard rate services—includes 2% 
10% other  food—includes 2% 
0%  bread, milk, edible oil 
    
HUNGARY  Introduced 1988 
25% standard  rate 
12%  foodstuffs, medicines, medical supplies, some textiles, coal and electricity, many 
services,  
0%  exports, textbooks, some medicines, gas and electricity development, construction 
Exempt:  financial services, health care, leasing residential buildings, insurance, education 
  
SLOVENIA  Introduced July 1999 
19% standard  rate 
8%  foodstuffs, medicines, dwelling construction, hotel accommodation and books 
0% exports 
Exempt:  banking, insurance, gambling 
  
YUGOSLAVIA-Serbia—sales tax 
20%  standard rate of 17% plus 3% federal tax 
Exempt:  bread, milk, some agricultural products, utilities 
  VAT to be introduced in 2003 
  
CZECH REPUBLIC    Introduced January 1993 
22% standard  rate 
5%  foodstuffs, pharmaceutical products and most services 
0% exports   18 
Exempt:  post, broadcasting, some financial services, health, transfer and lease of land and 
buildings, education, insurance 
  
GERMANY   
16% standard  rate 
7%  food, beverages, pharmaceuticals, newspapers, books, theaters, museums 
0% exports 
  
ITALY   
20% standard  rate 
10%  reduced rate   
4% reduced  rate 
0%  exports, international transport and transport services 
Exempt:  financial services, insurance, securities and medical services 
 
UNITED STATES—sales tax 
0-7%  state level only 
+ 0-3.5%  additional local level 
  
Sources  European Tax Handbook, 2000, Institut za Javnih Financije, 2000, Ministries of 
Finance, BiH, Ernst and Young, 2001. 
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